UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25173
27 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 25 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF HUNGARY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to his note of 26 October 1992 concerning the implementation of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 778 (1992).

Following inquiries by the competent Hungarian authorities, the Permanent Representative wishes to advise that there are no proceeds of the sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products subject to the provisions of resolution 778 (1992) in Hungary.

93-05584 3998e (E) 280193 01/02/93

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/25174
27 January 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 25 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to our letters protesting against violations of Iraqi airspace by United States aircraft and the dropping of heat flares and fire balls on areas in the Ninawa Governorate, the most recent of which was that circulated as document S/25088, I have the honour to inform you that two such aircraft dropped three heat flares from high altitude on an area 20 kilometres east of Mosul at 0942 hours on 21 January 1993.

That United States aircraft are continuing to drop heat flares provides further evidence of the persistence of the United States Government in inflicting damage on Iraq and its people and in infringing on its sovereignty and security. The Government of Iraq, once again affirming that the United States Government bears full responsibility for engaging in internationally prohibited acts, urges the Security Council to condemn such acts and to call upon that Government to desist therefrom and to provide compensation for the material damage thereby sustained by Iraq and its people.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Adnan MALIK
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

93-05590 5560a (E) 290193 290193 01/02/93

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25175
27 January 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 25 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continued their violations of Iraqi airspace for purposes of reconnaissance, provocation and aggression against Iraq during the period 12-19 January 1993.

12-13 January 1993

(a) Northern region: 38 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,500 to 10,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar, Zakho, Dohuk and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 53 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Samawah, Salman, Nasiriyah, Shatrah, Qurnah, the area to the south of Diwaniyah and Busayyah.

13-14 January 1993

(a) Northern region: 50 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 7,500 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Ayn Zalah, Zakho and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 159 sorties, flown by AWACS, F-4, F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Basra, Amarah, Busayyah, Diwaniyah, Ushbayhah, Salman, Qal'at Salih, Artawi, Nasiriyah, Lasaq, Mu'ayanah, Samawah, Najaf and Qurnah.

At 2120 hours on 13 January 1993, hostile aircraft committed a new act of aggression against Iraq in which one soldier and three civilians were killed and three soldiers and four civilians wounded when the aircraft in question attacked a residential complex comprising a number of inhabited dwellings near the petrochemical complex in the Basra Governorate.

14-15 January 1993

(a) Northern region: 46 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho, Amadiyah and Dukan.

(b) Southern region: 90 sorties, flown by F-4, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,500 to 9,500 metres, centred over Amarah, Nasiriyah, Shatrah, Samawah, Salman, Ushbayhah, Artawi, Jalibah and Busayyah.

15-16 January 1993

(a) Northern region: 51 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 3,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Dohuk, Amadiyah, Zakho, Mosul, Irbil and Tall Afar.

(b) Southern region: 98 sorties, flown by F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 9,500 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Artawi, Busayyah, Jalibah, Shatrah, Qal'at Salih and Qurnah.

16-17 January 1993

(a) Northern region: 48 sorties, flown by AWACS, F-4, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Tall Afar, Irbil and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 97 sorties, flown by TR-1, F-4, F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,500 metres, centred over Amarah, Nasiriyah, Khidr, Ushbayhah, Lasaq, Busayyah, Jalibah, Salman, Artawi and Qurnah.

17-18 January 1993

(a) Northern region: 56 sorties, flown by F-4, F-14 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 91 sorties, flown by Mirage, F-4, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Shatrah, Busayyah, and Qurnah.

18-19 January 1993

(a) Northern region: 61 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Tall Afar, Irbil, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.

(b) Southern region: 91 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,500 to 11,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Shatrah, Khidr, Salman, Ushbayhah, Lasaq, Najaf, the area to the south of Diwaniyah and Busayyah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Adnan MALIK
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25176
27 January 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit to you herewith an article entitled "Making the Desert Glow", published in the 21 January 1993 edition of The New York Times, which recounts how United States forces and their allies used depleted uranium shells during their aggression against Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex - the aforementioned article from The New York Times - circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Adnan MALIK
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

93-05602 3706c (E) 290193 290193 01/02/93

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"All the News That's Fit to Print"

The New York Times

Late Edition

VOL. CXLII No. 49,218 NEW YORK, THURSDAY, JANUARY 23, 1993 33

THE NEW YORK TIMES OP-ED THURSDAY, JANUARY 21, 1993

Making the Desert Glow

By Eric Hoskins

AMMAN, Jordan

The gulf war lives on, as this week's air strikes against Iraq have proved. But the conflict goes beyond Iraqi missile batteries in forbidden places. It extends, frighteningly, to radioactive artillery shells used by coalition forces two years ago. The spent rounds may be the cause of fatal illnesses, including cancer and mysterious new stomach ailments, showing up in Iraqi children. Because of sanctions and war, the death rate of children under 5 has tripled. In the first eight months of 1991 alone, 50,000 children died.

Known as depleted uranium penetrators, the shells were developed by the Pentagon in the late 1970's as anti-tank, armor-piercing projectiles. Depleted uranium, which makes up the shell's core, is a radioactive by-product of the enrichment process used to make atomic bombs and nuclear fuel rods. The material is extremely hard and abundant, and provided free to weapons manufacturers by the nuclear industry.

When fired, the core bursts into a searing flame that helps it pierce the armor of tanks and other military targets. Diesel vapors inside the tank are ignited, and the crew is burned alive.

In the six-week land war against Iraq, U.S. and allied coalition tanks, artillery and attack planes fired at least 10,000 of the 6-inch, 6- to 8-pound shells. A confidential report by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, written in April 1991 and leaked to The Independent newspaper of London in November of that year, estimates that at least 40 tons of depleted uranium was dispersed in Iraq and Kuwait during the war.

Among other things, the depleted uranium rounds forced the Pentagon to concede additional friendly-fire casualties when traces of radioactivity were found on destroyed coalition military vehicles. Iraqi forces did not have uranium penetrators.

While it's too early to prove a link, many health experts suspect that the postwar increase in childhood cancer and mysterious swollen abdomens is at least in part due to the radioactive shells. U.N. personnel and aid workers have seen children playing with empty shells, abandoned weapons and destroyed tanks. In Basra, a foreign doctor saw a child using depleted uranium shells as hand puppets.

The Pentagon insists that depleted uranium is "very, very mildly radioactive" and that the shells are not radioactive enough to be classified as a "radiological weapon." It has claimed that allied tank crews firing the rounds received little radiation, the equivalent of a chest X ray each day.

Most doctors and scientists agree that even mild radiation is dangerous and increases the risk of cancer. The health risk becomes much greater once the projectile has been fired.

Eric Hoskins, a doctor and public health specialist, was medical coordinator of the Harvard Study Team's surveys of health and welfare in postwar Iraq.

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U.S. uranium shells used in the gulf war may be killing Iraqi children.

After they have been fired, the broken shells release uranium particles. The airborne particles enter the body easily. The uranium then deposits itself in bones, organs and cells. Children are especially vulnerable because their cells divide rapidly as they grow. In pregnant women, absorbed uranium can cross the placenta into the bloodstream of the fetus.

In addition to its radioactive dangers, uranium is chemically toxic, like lead, and can damage the kidneys or lungs. Perhaps the fatal epidemic of swollen abdomens among Iraqi children is caused by kidney failure resulting from uranium poisoning. Whatever the effect of the depleted uranium shells, it is made worse by malnutrition and poor health conditions.

The British report called the presence of depleted uranium in Iraq and Kuwait a "significant problem," concluding that there is enough uranium there to cause "tens of thousands of potential deaths." Fortunately, there have been no reports of uranium-related illnesses in Kuwait. That may be because fewer uranium shells were used there — most of the heavy ground fighting took place in southern Iraq — and because the country was cleaned up after the war.

The danger posed by the uranium shells is widely recognized. In July, German authorities arrested Siegwart Gunther, director of the Albert Schweitzer Institute, when he arrived in Berlin carrying a spent round retrieved from Iraq. He was charged with illegally "releasing ionizing radiation."

The shell, its radioactivity confirmed by two laboratories, was sealed in a lead-lined box. Needless to say, there are not many lead-lined boxes in Iraq.

It's likely that the depleted uranium may have already contaminated soil and drinking water in Iraq. If this is the case, Iraqis could be exposed to the radioactive and toxic effects of uranium for generations to come.

Certainly such fears are not without foundation. In New Mexico, where uranium rounds are test-fired by the military, questions have been raised concerning ground water poisoning. In 1986, James Parker, then associate director of the Bureau of Land Management, told Congress that land used to test these weapons could be permanently contaminated.

Despite the risks associated with depleted uranium, there has been virtually no debate about its effects in postwar Iraq and Kuwait. The U.N. Environment Program, which has investigated ecological damage of the gulf war, has been remarkably silent. To date, no effort has been made to assess the extent of radioactive contamination due to depleted uranium rounds in Iraq or to locate and remove the shells. Similarly, although Congress has ordered the military to monitor the health of soldiers exposed to smoke from Kuwaiti oil fires, there has been no such directive concerning exposure to depleted uranium.

What should be done? Once current tensions in the gulf have subsided, qualified research groups, like the 1991 Harvard Study Team, should go to Iraq to analyze the soil and water for evidence of uranium contamination. Epidemiologists should explore the connection between the uranium shells and cancer. The U.N. must take a more active role in investigating the danger posed by the shells, and begin clean-up efforts of all radioactive shells remaining in Iraq and Kuwait.

It should also consider recommending that depleted uranium penetrators be banned in accordance with international treaties on chemical and radioactive weapons. □

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25177
27 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to attach the text of a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. R. F. Botha, concerning the situation in Angola. I should be grateful if the letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) V. R. W. STEWARD
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Letter dated 27 January 1993 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General

The deteriorating situation in Angola and the collapse of the peace process can have far-reaching implications, not only for Angola but for the entire sub-continent. The South African Government has consistently, in support of international efforts, attempted to defuse the tension between the two parties and to facilitate a meeting between the two leaders. The South African Government has consistently urged both parties to implement the Bicesse Accords, and to accept the election results of 29 and 30 September 1992 in order to enhance mutual understanding and national reconciliation.

The present conflict is a tragedy for the people of Angola, who illustrated by their substantial participation in the elections, that they desire peace, democracy and economic well-being.

During my visits to Angola in November 1992, I warned both parties that unless they entered into dialogue as a matter of urgency, it was inevitable that the situation would deteriorate. I pointed out that this would result in an increasing failure on both sides to honour their obligations under the peace accords. The recent deterioration in the political and military situation in Angola has borne out my worst fears and concerns.

As fellow Africans we can however not despair of the Angolan peace process. We are morally obliged to assist each other in our quest for peace. During a meeting of the Interaction Council in Cape Town on 22 January 1993, Mr. Lopo do Nascimento, Deputy Speaker of the Angolan Parliament, made allegations of continued South African military support for UNITA. Later the same day President F. W. de Klerk met with members of the Interaction Council led by the former British Prime Minister, Lord Callaghan. President de Klerk pointed out that it was South Africa's declared policy on Angola that the conflict in that country should be ended, and that the efforts by the United Nations to achieve peace should be supported. He added that the democratic process which had begun in Angola should be continued and completed as soon as possible. South Africa would continue to encourage both parties to resume dialogue and enter into negotiations to achieve this objective.

President de Klerk said that he wished to give the categoric assurance that the South African Government was not supporting UNITA militarily or in any other way. As regards Mr. do Nascimento's allegations that South Africa was supplying ammunition to UNITA for G-5 artillery pieces, President de Klerk stated that he had again asked for a report from the Chief of the South African Defence Force (SADF) who reported as follows:

"UNITA does not have any artillery pieces of South African origin and definitely does not have any G-5 guns or ammunition. It is known that UNITA has M-46 (130 mm) and D-30 (122 mm) guns which the movement captured from the Angolan defence force in previous years, while it also has 107 mm multiple rocket launchers. None of the above equipment is utilized in the SADF. Both the M-46 and D-30 guns are large and could have been confused with South African guns. The SADF is not providing support to UNITA and military aircraft are not used to supply UNITA."

As regards allegations of unauthorized flights over neighbouring States, President de Klerk said that these allegations had been thoroughly investigated by the SADF as well as the South African civil aviation authorities. The South African Government was satisfied that no unauthorized flights by military aircraft had taken place.

President de Klerk added that aircraft had flown to Mucusso in south-eastern Angola to resupply the local hospital, of which the Angolan Government was aware. However, at the insistence of the Angolan Government, the hospital had been closed and South African doctors and nurses had been withdrawn on 23 December 1992.

President de Klerk furthermore acknowledged that it was possible that private aircraft could operate from small and remote airfields in South Africa. He noted that any deviation in foreign airspace from previously submitted flight plans could not be monitored from South Africa.

In response to a question from Lord Callaghan, President de Klerk indicated that the South African Government would take stern action in respect of any such unauthorized activity. He also noted that while he did not have any indication that UNITA was being supported from South Africa, he would not hesitate to act upon any concrete evidence which was presented to him.

The Angolan Minister of Defence alleged on 22 January 1993 that a South African Hercules C-130 aircraft had been shot down in Angola. Originally it was stated by the Angolan authorities that the plane had been shot down "flying out of Jamba". It was later alleged by the Angolan authorities that the plane came down in the central province of Huambo at a site which is far removed from Jamba. The South African Government publicly denied on 23 January 1993 that any South African Air Force aircraft had been shot down in Angola and urgently requested the Angolan Government to provide evidence to this effect. The Government requested that the registration number of the aircraft and other details be provided.

During a meeting with Mr. do Nascimento in Johannesburg on 24 January 1993, I again insisted that the Angolan Government provide evidence and further information concerning their allegations. Mr. do Nascimento undertook to convey this request to the Angolan Government. I am still awaiting a response.

The South African Government will not support any party which opts for a miltary solution in Angola, nor will it support any party which attempts to obtain advantages which are inconsistent with the democratic process. The South African Government believes that the only way ahead in Angola now is that proposed by the United Nations Security Council. Namely that the two parties should engage in dialogue, under the auspices of the United Nations, without delay and that the Bicesse Accords be urgently reactivated with a view to their full implementation. Decisive and urgent action is now required on the part of the Security Council in order to avert a disaster in Angola. Your efforts as well as the applicable Security Council resolutions should receive tangible support from the international community and in particular from Africa. There is no alternative for the Angolans other than to engage in discussions aimed at national reconciliation and at the participation of all parties in the democratic process within the framework of the Bicesse Accords. It is of the utmost importance that the United Nations presence should be maintained in Angola.

I was encouraged to learn from the Angolan Government as well as from Dr. Jonas Savimbi on 25 January 1993, that they had agreed in principle to hold talks under the auspices of the United Nations.

We must, however, have no illusions about the difficulties that lie ahead, particularly in creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence, tolerance and respect, after many years of bitter civil war.

I wish to assure you, Mr. Secretary-General, of my Government's full support for your endeavours to bring peace to Angola. The South African Government remains willing to play a positive and supportive role in this endeavour.

(Signed) R. F. BOTHA

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25177*
3 February 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

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Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Reissued for technical reasons.

Annex

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During a meeting of the Interaction Council in Cape Town on 22 January 1993, Mr. Lopo do Nascimento, Deputy Speaker of the Angolan Parliament, made allegations of continued South African military support for UNITA. Later the same day President F. W. de Klerk met with members of the Interaction Council led by the former British Prime Minister, Lord Callaghan. President de Klerk pointed out that it was South Africa's declared policy on Angola that the conflict in that country should be ended, and that the efforts by the United Nations to achieve peace should be supported. He added that the democratic process which had begun in Angola should be continued and completed as soon as possible. South Africa would continue to encourage both parties to resume dialogue and enter into negotiations to achieve this objective.

President de Klerk said that he wished to give the categoric assurance that the South African Government was not supporting UNITA militarily or in any other way. As regards Mr. do Nascimento's allegations that South Africa was supplying ammunition to UNITA for G-5 artillery pieces, President de Klerk stated that he had again asked for a report from the Chief of the South African Defence Force (SADF) who reported as follows:

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President de Klerk added that aircraft had flown to Mucusso in south-eastern Angola to resupply the local hospital, of which the Angolan Government was aware. However, at the insistence of the Angolan Government, the hospital had been closed and South African doctors and nurses had been withdrawn on 23 December 1992.

President de Klerk furthermore acknowledged that it was possible that private aircraft could operate from small and remote airfields in South Africa. He noted that any deviation in foreign airspace from previously submitted flight plans could not be monitored from South Africa.

In response to a question from Lord Callaghan, President de Klerk indicated that the South African Government would take stern action in respect of any such unauthorized activity. He also noted that while he did not have any indication that UNITA was being supported from South Africa, he would not hesitate to act upon any concrete evidence which was presented to him.

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We must, however, have no illusions about the difficulties that lie ahead, particularly in creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence, tolerance and respect, after many years of bitter civil war.

I wish to assure you, Mr. Secretary-General, of my Government's full support for your endeavours to bring peace to Angola. The South African Government remains willing to play a positive and supportive role in this endeavour.

(Signed) R. F. BOTHA

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25178
27 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations among members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3165th meeting, on 27 January 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation prevailing in and adjacent to the United Nations Protected areas in Croatia":

"The Security Council is deeply concerned to learn from the Secretary-General that the offensive by the Croatian armed forces continues unabated in flagrant violation of resolution 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993, at a crucial time in the peace process.

"The Council demands that military action by all parties and others concerned cease immediately. It further demands that all parties and others concerned comply fully and immediately with all the provisions of resolution 802 (1993) and with other relevant Security Council resolutions.

"The Council once again demands that all parties and others concerned respect fully the safety of United Nations personnel and guarantee their freedom of movement. The Council reiterates that it will hold the political and military leaders involved in the conflict responsible and accountable for the safety of the United Nations peace-keeping personnel in the area.

"The Security Council will remain actively seized of the matter, in particular with a view to considering what further steps might be necessary to ensure that resolution 802 (1993) and other relevant Security Council resolutions are fully implemented."

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25179
27 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations stating that Mr. Edward S. Walker, Jr. has been appointed deputy representative of the United States of America on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

93-05529 3817j (E) 270193

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25180
28 January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982, and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 22 January 1993 (S/25150 and Add.1) and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 18 January 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/25125),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL for a further interim period of six months, that is until 31 July 1993;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

93-05950 4911Z (E) 280193 28/01/93